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Abstract 
 
 
In this paper, we argue that shadow activities and different levels of marketization of household 
production systematically distort international comparisons of aggregate gross household saving 
rates (HSRs): Higher shares of hidden income increase observed HSRs. Panel data for 18 (24) 
OECD-countries covering a period of a decade show that gross HSRs are positively related to the 
degree of corruption (used as a proxy for the propensity to shift  economic activities into the 
shadow) and to the share of income from property and self employment. At the same time, gross 
HSRs are negatively related to the female employment rate, the ratio of indirect taxes to direct 
taxes, and to the tax wedge. One plausible story behind these phenomena might be that unobserved 
consumption and wages in the shadow labor market induce an upward bias in observed HSRs and 
profit shares, while the price level effects of a higher share of indirect taxes and a ‘welfare state’ 
effect lower observed HSRs. 
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1 Introduction1
Huge and systematic di¤erences in aggregate household saving rates between dif-
ferent countries tend to persist over considerable periods of time. This raises the
question of whether these di¤erences are a mere statistical artifact, or whether
behavioral or institutional di¤erences can be identied. This paper argues -
basically (albeit not exclusively) - in favor of the rst hypothesis: Observed
household saving rates still seem to be distorted by non-observable income
components, in spite of the ambitious attempts to measure GDP and income
according to the concept of exhaustiveness (OECD, 2002). It is clear that such
a distortion, if present, might also be relevant to some of the conclusions drawn
from the existing literature about determinants of private and/or national sav-
ing (Loyaza et al., 2000; Edwards, 1996; Masson, Bayoumi and Samiei, 19 95;
Swaleheen, 2007).
2 The macro perspective
As is well known, international comparisons of household saving rates (Ross,
2004 ) at the macro level are mineelds of statistical distortions. Some are
related to conceptual and denitional divergences between national accounting
practices, which - in principle - it should be possible to overcome.
For example, consumption of xed capital by households is di¢cult to esti-
mate, and the treatment of private and public pension schemes and of non-prot
1For helpful comments we are grateful to participants of the conference
Shadow 2009 in Münster.
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organizations di¤ers. The relative shares of tax-nanced public expenditure on
health and education (individual public consumption), the relative shares of
direct versus indirect taxation, the borderline between corporate savings and
household savings - all these conceptual issues matter in this context.2
One frequentely neglected conceptual problem is related to human capital in-
vestment: In highly developed economies, human capital intensity might induce
a downward bias in observed saving ratios. Other problems are more di¢cult
to solve than purely conceptual distortions, as they are linked to unobservable
variables, e.g. the di¤erent shares of household production for own use and the
size of the shadow and underground economy.
Let us take a brief look at the root of some of the measurement problems
associated with unobserved income by writing down familiar simplied identi-
ties.3 Household-related terms are indexed by h, government-related terms by
g, disposable income by d; and the disposable income of households adjusted
for individual government consumption by hdj. Corporate disposable income
(=corporate saving) is indexed by c: The capital T indicates taxes (net of trans-
fers or subsidies). For the sake of simplicity, let us ignore potential di¤erences
between GDP, GNI and disposable national income, which is the sum of dispos-
able income of households (Yhd), of the government (Ygd), and of corporations
(Ycd). Investment, I; includes private plus government gross investment expen-
2However, by correcting saving rates for some of those denitional distortions, Ross (2004)
has shown that existing di¤erences between US, Europe and Japan become even larger.
3 In the following, we focus on the logical relationships between measurement errors in the
case of expenditure categories and household saving rates, regularly derived as a residual,
not on the many practical pitfalls (double-counting, coverage, representation) associated with
the use of di¤erent measurement approaches (production approach, income approach and
expenditure approach). See also OECD (2002, 2006).
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diture. Aggregate saving (gross) is dened as the sum of aggregate household
saving, Sh, corporate saving, Sc(= Ycd); and government saving, Sg.
Y = Ch + I + Cg +X  M (1)
Y = Yhd + Ygd + Ycd (2)
Cg = C
coll
g + C
indiv
g (3)
Yhd = Y   Ycd   (Tind + Tdir) (4)
sh =
Yhd   Ch
Yhd
=
Sh
Yhd
(5)
Yhdj = Yhd + C
indiv
g (6)
shdj =
Yhdj  
 
Ch + C
indiv
g

Yhdj
=
Yhd   Ch
Yhd + C indivg
(7)
Sg = Tind + Tdir   C
coll
g   C
indiv
g (8)
Sh + Sg + Sc = I +X  M (9)
As countries di¤er substantially in the extent to which they nance individ-
ual consumption via taxes, only adjusted disposable saving rates, shdj , can be
compared in a meaningful way (7). It is obvious from (7) and (5) that ceteris
paribus unadjusted saving rates, sh, are higher in countries with higher shares of
tax-nanced expenditures for health or educational purposes. Note also that the
structure of taxation might be of some relevance. Observed household saving
rates will be lower in countries with higher indirect taxation relative to direct
taxation.4
4This downward distortion does depend upon specic assumptions with respect to tax
incidence: The indirect tax must be shifted forward (at least partly).
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Unfortunately, as the true aggregates can never be observed perfectly, there
will always be unobserved components. Because the sum of observed and unob-
served components (indexed below with o and uo) must be equal to the true
aggregates, the identities shown above must also hold separately for unobserved
and observed components.
For the specic question raised, namely whether observed adjusted house-
hold saving rates, shdj;o, are distorted by the unobservable adjusted disposable
income of households, a broad denition of the unobservable economy (in line
with the OECD (2002) recommendations, which includes household production
for own use, the underground economy and the informal economy) might be
better suited than a narrower one. Furthermore, even income from some illegal
productive activities (e.g. smuggling of cigarettes and drugs, illegal gambling
etc., excluding pure redistributive activities) that circumvent government regu-
lation, taxation or observation should also be included in the present context.
The following equations, which are true by denition, will be useful in clar-
ifying certain relationships. The implicit denitional relationship between the
true adjusted household saving rate (shdj) and the observed adjusted household
saving rate (shdj;o) is
shdj;o =
Shdj   Shdj;uo
Yhdj;o
(10)
shdj;o =
Shdj=Yhdj
Yhdj;o=Yhdj
 
Shdj;uo
Yhdj;o
(11)
shdj;o = shdj(1 +
Yhdj;uo
Yhdj;o
) 
Shdj;uo
Yhdj;o
(12)
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Equation (12) will be used as the logical frame of reference for our discussion
below.
In the following, let us assume that two countries, i and j, are identical
in every respect and all components of nal demand and income are correctly
observed.
2.1 Marketization of household services
To refer to a famous example rst given by Sir John Hicks, let us assume that
someone marries her cook in country i. Observed production, the adjusted
disposable income of households and consumption are reduced by the same
amount. As Shdj;uo = 0 and Yhdj;uo > 0; equation (12) implies shdj;o > shdj .
Observed adjusted household saving rates will be distorted upwards in country
i. If the overall tax burden remains unchanged, this is the end of the story. If
direct taxes formerly paid by the cook turn into additional disposable income
for the household, the upward bias might be even larger.5
The inverse process - marketization of household production - obviously low-
ers the observed household saving rate. Note that former household production
(e.g. care for elderly, childcare) might also shift to the public sector, where it
would be measured as an increment of non-market production (= individual
public consumption). One might call such a process the socialization of house-
hold production. Using adjusted income and saving might eliminate at least
part of this particular distortion.
5Data provided by Eustat (2004) or by the OECD (1997) show that shares of household
production relative to GDP are relatively high (average 38 % of GDP).
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2.2 Shadow activities
Whether certain trades can be more or less easily concealed in tax audits and/or
national accounting depends upon their specic characteristics, in particular
upon the expected transaction costs (including all types of legal risks) associated
with such a strategy.6
2.2.1 Unobserved household consumption
On the one hand, small-scale services consumed by households (restaurant- and
hotel services, medical and counseling services, educational and other personal
services, handicraft and art activities, etc.) seem to t into shadow activities
more easily than large-scale investment or industrial production in general. On
the other hand, one has to acknowledge that industrial transfer pricing practices
linked to exports and imports might also be a source of signicant distortions
(see below for a detailed discussion).
At the small-scale level, shadow activities will be found in lines of business,
where the share of value added relative to intermediate consumption is large
and potential gains from tax evasion can be distributed within a small coalition
of trading partners. Statistics are clearly aware of that problem and regularly
try to correct o¢cial estimates of GDP by measuring the non-observed econ-
omy according to the guidelines of the OECD (2002). The decisive question is
therefore whether those guidelines are su¢cient and whether they are applied
6Compare, for instance, Feige (1997, 1998), Schneider (1994a, 2003), Frey and Weck-
Hahnemann (1984).
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consistently across countries.
One might expect that with regard to the measurement of household saving
rates, the bulk of unobserved activities ignored by o¢cial estimates will be linked
to household consumption and should be concentrated in small-scale activities,
which lower Chdj;o and Yhdj;o by similar absolute amounts, thereby denitely
increasing observed aggregate household saving rates.
Besides private consumption, however, alternative entry points for shadow
distortions do exist.
2.2.2 Unobserved taxes and public consumption
Unobserved taxes exist where public o¢cials or civil servants demand payments
for services above what they are legally entitled to receive. One example is the
health care sector, where certain services (e.g. in Southern European countries)
are marketed in a more or less corrupt way and patients with obligatory state
insurance are often expected to pay an additional private fee, although such
payments are o¢cially prohibited. Other types of public services (education,
public security) might su¤er from similar distortions. Because the additional fees
are necessary to obtain services of adequate quality, unobserved tax revenues
are equivalent to unobserved individual public consumption (Tuo = C
indiv
g;uo ). The
observed adjusted disposable income, Yhdj;o, corrected for these unobserved com-
ponents will remain unchanged. The unadjusted disposable income of house-
holds, however, will be lower. Therefore, the absolute amount of household
saving will also be lower. We may conclude that household saving rates will be
8
distorted upwards by such unobserved productive corruption.
On the other hand, unobserved taxes might be pure redistribution via black-
mail. Pure redistribution implies only redistribution within the household sec-
tor and does not (systematically) distort aggregate household saving rates.
2.2.3 Unobserved investment
Measured investment is distorted by many factors (Kirova and Lipsey, 1998),
probably inducing an underestimation of investment expenditures, at least in
general.
First, there is the well-known problem of physical versus human capital. It
seems to be plausible that human capital accumulation becomes more important
in richer countries. Such investments, however, are conventionally treated as
public or private consumption outlays, creating a downward bias in observed
investment (and saving) in highly developed countries, which implies that I >
Io and therefore Sh;uo = Iuo > 0. In European countries, expenditures for
software are treated as intermediate consumption in contrast to the practice in
the US), resulting in underestimates of investment and saving. Underestimation
(Iuo > 0) might also be the result of private construction activities trying to
avoid taxes or building regulations, or because production is completely illegal.
As Iuo > 0, unobserved household saving rates will be positive and the observed
saving rate will be biased downwards. Because the imputed rents of owner-
occupied housing and the corresponding consumption and income components
will also be underestimated, this bias is somewhat mitigated.
9
2.2.4 Unobserved current account decit/surplus
If imports become partly unobserved due to the smuggling of household con-
sumption goods (cigarettes, drugs, counterfeit branded articles, etc.), thenMo <
M: Therefore, observed adjusted household saving and income are also larger
than true saving and income (Shdj;uo = Yhdj;uo =  Muo < 0). This implies
ceteris paribus that observed saving rates are biased upwards by unobserved
imports. Unobserved imports due to smuggling might be of some relevance
in Italy or Greece with their long EU borders, coast-lines and high levels of
corruption.
Entrepreneurs might also shift prots to foreign countries via exaggerated
license fees, which would imply a negative value for Muo, as Mo > M . There-
fore Shdj;uo + Sc;uo =  Muo > 0: Observed household/corporate saving rates
are biased downwards if prots are shifted across borders. It seems plausible
that the measurement error falls primarily, but not exclusively, on corporate
savings. Such e¤ects might be of some relevance in Scandinavia, which is vir-
tuall free of corruption. Small high-tax countries, where the shares of exports
and imports are larger by denition, will obviously be more vulnerable to this
type of distortion.
Similarly, prots might be shifted to foreign subsidiaries by means of lower
transfer prices for exports, implying Xuo > 0. Observed (household + corpo-
rate) savings (and saving rates) will be biased downwards in high-tax countries
(like those in Scandinavia). Conversely, a corresponding upward bias exists in
some low-tax country (e.g. Switzerland, Ireland?).
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The opposite case, Xo > X, refers to ctitious exports (Shdj;uo + Sc;uo =
Xuo < 0). Such exports might be induced by export subsidies or for tax rea-
sons, probably implying (Shdj;o > Shdj) and an upward bias in observed adjusted
household saving rates. Value-added tax fraud across borders might also con-
tribute to this type of distortion.
2.2.5 Shadow activities and prot shares
A decisive question with respect to the relationship between prot shares and
shadow activities is whether it is easier to hide revenues or shadow inputs. If
a large shadow labor market exists and revenues are more di¢cult to hide, it
seems to be reasonable to expect that observed prot shares would be distorted
upwards.7
On the other hand, one has to acknowledge that there are many other rea-
sons why higher prot shares might be related to higher household saving rates
regardless of shadow activities. In some countries (like Italy), small business
rms (and high shares of self-employment) are still a widespread phenomenon,
while in other countries (e.g. in Scandinavia) the bulk of prots comes from
large corporate rms. It is clear that self-employed subjects have sound eco-
nomic reasons (retirement, precautionary savings) to raise - ceteris paribus -
their true saving rates above the level common among employees.
7 Imagine a construction contract between a principal and an agent where the terms of
delivery are xed (and transparent to scal authorities), while the agent employs small-scale
subcontractors from the shadow labor market to increase his/her prots.
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3 Preliminary evidence
Fig. 1 illustrates the relationship between mean gross household saving rates
(OECD Annual National Accounts 1995-2006) and mean levels of corruption,
dened as ten minus the corruption perception index (Transparency Interna-
tional 1995-2006) for those 18 OECD countries where balanced data were avail-
able. (In the econometric estimates below, the unbalanced countries of Spain,
Ireland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia are added to our
sample.) The corruption level is interpreted as a soft proxy for the country-
specic attitudes with regard to law-abiding behavior, and therefore also as a
proxy for the tendency to shift economic activities into the shadow.
Gross adjusted household saving is dened as the adjusted net saving of
households plus consumption of xed capital. The change in equities of pen-
sion funds is excluded from household saving, as this adjustement is still not
applied uniformly across OECD countries. The gross adjusted disposable in-
come of households is dened as gross disposable income plus individual public
consumption, in order to take account of various levels of tax-nanced individual
consumption acting as a substitute for private consumption.
There seems to be a remarkably strong positive correlation (R = +0.808)
between mean gross adjusted household saving rates and the level of corruption.
Let us look for some other indications that saving rates might be biased
upwards by unobservable income components. Fig. 2 shows the relationship
between female employment rates and saving rates for the same countries as
above.
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Figure 1: Corruption and gross adjusted household saving rates
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Figure 2: Female employment rates and gross adjusted household saving rates
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Figure 3: Prot shares and gross adjusted household saving rates
Fig. 3 reveals a similarly close correlation between mean prot shares and
gross adjusted household saving rates.
Note that the share of income from property and self-employment varies con-
siderably across countries. At least part of this variation might be a statistical
artifact caused by the existence of a black labor market. However, let us bear
in mind that our concept of shadow activities is somewhat broader than usual.
These scatter plots seem to support the following simple story:
Higher levels of corruption are associated with more intense shadow
activities, which in turn imply lower levels of visible (female) em-
ployment and (due to black market labor income) higher visible
shares of prot income.
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Let us now look at further anecdotal evidence and some cross-sectional
econometrics.
4 Empirical analysis
Household saving rates for 24 developed countries were calculated using the
Annual National Accounts (detailed tables). Although various other denitions
were also tested, the gross adjusted household saving rate was the preferred one.
The explanatory variables used on the r.h.s. are as follows:
 The Corruption Perception Index as published by Transparency Interna-
tional and adjusted for sampling deciencies by Lambsdor¤ (2005) was
transformed into an index of corruption (corr=10-cpi). This variable was
used as an (admittedly soft) proxy for the general moral propensity to
accept tax evasion and shadow activities as a way of life.8 We expect
this variable to be positively related to HSR.
 The female employment rates (fem_rate) based on OECD Labor Force
Statistics are used as a proxy for the marketization of household produc-
tion. We expect this rate to be negatively related to HSR.
 Di¤erences in levels and cyclical shifts of the income distribution (e.g.
8Data for the share of shadow activities provided by Schneider, F. et al. (2006) will not be
used for the following reasons: Their shares.of the shadow economy in virtually corruption free
Scandinavia are approximately as high as the gures for corruption-ridden Slovakia. Given
the culture of transparency for tax declarations and the general moral conduct with regard
to public a¤airs in Scandinavia, these results are extremely implausible. Our skepticism gains
some support from Renoy, P., Ivarsson, St., van der Wusten-Gritsay, O. & Meijer, E. (2004),
who shed severe doubt on the suggested high levels of shadow activities in Scandinavia. See
also the methodological criticism raised by Thomas (1999).
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increases in the share of income from property and self-employment) will
surely be an independent cause - unrelated to measurement distortions
- behind cross-sectional di¤erences in levels and changes of the HSR. As
the variable prot_share (source: ANA tables) might capture some of the
variation related to shadow activities, the expected positive relationship
between corr or corr and the household saving rate will probably be
biased downwards.
 The ratio of indirect taxes relative to the sum of indirect and direct taxes
on income and wealth, tind_share (source: ANA tables), is postulated
to be negatively related to adjusted household saving rates. Behind this
hypothesis, an implicit incidence assumption has to be made: indirect
taxes are shifted forward. Increasing indirect and lowering direct taxation
by compensating amounts raises consumption expenditures and disposable
income (approximately) pari passu.
 In modern welfare states, at least part of household saving is socialized
via social security. Social security contributions might be seen by house-
holds as a (partial) substitute for voluntary precautionary savings. There-
fore, we expect that a higher tax wedge (tax_wedge), measured as the
ratio of direct taxes on income and wealth plus transfers paid by house-
holds relative to the unadjusted disposable income of households, should
be negatively related to household saving rates.
 To control for the business cycle e¤ects, we add the current and lagged
16
values of the GDP-gap (= gap) as a further explanatory variable for the
HSR.
Specic data limitations and econometric problems exist:
The cross-sectional sample for which balanced OECD data (Annual National
Accounts) on household saving rates exist is small (18 countries). As the cpi
is only available from 1995 to 2005, we have to make do with a decade of data
points. The relationships were also tested, however, for an extended, unbalanced
sample of 24 OECD countries.
In Section 3, we presented some preliminary evidence for our hypotheses.
Those gures demonstrated the correlation between the saving rate and the
corruption index, the female employment rates and the prot shares. Table 1
shows the underlying regression results for these scatter plots.
Main Variables Coe¢cient t-Value
corr 2.22 5.48
fem_rate -0.40 -4.91
prot_share 0.44 4.58
tax_wedge -0.12 -2.31
tind_share 3.56 2.47
Table 1: Simple regression coe¢cients and t-values for regressions of the
mean of gross household saving rates to the means of the corruption index, the
female employment, the prot share, the tax wedge and the share of indirect
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taxes.9
With the exception of tind_share, all correlations show the expected sign
and are highly signicant. However, as these are the results of simple univariate
regressions, they can only represent the starting point for further analysis.
In the following, we will proceed with pooled regression analysis and several
panel data models, including xed e¤ects models, dynamic xed e¤ects models,
panels with autocorrelated disturbances, and last but not least, dynamic panel
data models based on the system GMM estimators of the Arellano-Bover and
Blundell-Bond type.10 All of these estimation techniques have their specic
strengths and weaknesses. We will address these issues in some detail when we
discuss our estimation results.
The estimation results are summarized in Table 2. In all cases, the dependent
variable is the gross household saving rate. All reported t-values are robust
against heteroscedastic and autocorrelated errors. Estimation was generally
carried out with Stata 10; only variant (4) was estimated using Eviews 6.0.
Column (1) shows the results for a static pooled OLS regression. Besides
our main variables in Table 1, the GDP gap for the current and previous period
is also included, thus accounting for business cycle e¤ects on the saving rate.
This basic set of variables is common to all our estimated variants. With the
exception of tind_share, all our main variables exhibit the expected sign and are
at least statistically signicant at a 10% level. Tind_share shows the wrong
9 Indirect taxes/(taxes on income and wealth + transfers paid by households + indirect
taxes)
10Arellano and Bover (1995), Blundell and Bond (2000).
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sign but with a t-value of 0.8 this is clearly not conclusive. In some other variants
of static pooled OLS not reported here, tind_share showed a negative sign, but
these results were insignicant as well. Overall R2 is about 0.66, meaning that
the equation ts the data quite well.
The main advantage of simple pooled regression is that cross-sectional as
well as time series information is taken into account. However, this method also
leaves several issues unresolved. First, variant (1) does not consider any dynamic
e¤ects. Second, in the presence of some unobserved country-specic and time-
invariant e¤ects which could be correlated with our right-hand variables, biased
and inconsistent results are to be expected. This is a major drawback, as some
country-specic e¤ects on saving rates are highly probable. Third, we have
the usual endogenous di¢culties and possibly an additional error in variables
problem, leading also to inconsistent estimates. In some fortunate instances,
these biases could o¤set each other to some extent, but there is no guarantee
for this.
The following estimated variants serve to address these issues step by step.
In Column (2) of Table 2, the pooled regression is extended to include
the lagged saving rate in order to take some dynamic e¤ects into account. The
results are rather poor. Only the prot share is statistically signicant. The
rest of our main variables are insignicant or even exhibit the wrong sign. The
coe¢cient of the lagged saving rate is nearly 0.9 and highly signicant, so the
saving rate is mainly explained by its own history. R2 was about 0.92, thus the
overall t improved remarkably. However, it is well known that in the presence
19
Table 2 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Gross household saving rate. Data for 18 western OECD countries form 1996 -2006. 
Robust t-values in parentheses. Variables described in the text. 
*, **, *** significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
Regarding the variable corr, we sometimes actually used the lagged value. Generally, a richer dynamic 
specification occasionally seems to be preferable, especially for corr, as both current and lagged values of corr 
seem to play a role (with the same sign). To limit the number of variables and to make the results more 
comparable we had chosen to present the results with only one time period per main variable.  
Coefficients (1) 
OLS,stat 
(2) 
OLS,dyn  
(3) 
FE 
(4) 
GLS-FE 
(5) 
BB 
(6) 
BB+TD 
(7) 
IV 
corr 0.777*** -0.0102 0.424* 0.323*** 0.664** 0.428* 0.941** 
 (3.08) (-0.088) (1.70) (2.64) (2.46) (1.81) (2.14) 
fem_rate -0.170*** 0.00753 -0.0771 -0.107* 0.0401 0.0858 0.0707 
 (-3.31) (0.28) (-1.15) (-1.69) (0.37) (0.92) (0.54) 
profit_share 0.104* 0.0495* 0.335*** 0.367*** 0.0949 0.182* 0.234 
 (1.66) (1.76) (3.42) (5.19) (0.70) (1.68) (1.24) 
tax_wedge -0.0439*** -0.00398 -0.224*** -0.359*** 0.0283 -0.0108 0.0598 
 (-3.62) (-0.68) (-3.66) (-7.81) (0.88) (-0.32) (0.98) 
tind_share 0.370 -0.0780 -4.043** -5.364*** -1.371 -1.041 -2.875* 
 (0.80) (-0.38) (-2.35) (-5.95) (-1.15) (-0.84) (-1.95) 
gap -0.458*** -0.374*** -0.338*** -0.251*** -0.255 -0.509*** -0.447*** 
 (-2.67) (-3.65) (-6.51) (-5.31) (-1.25) (-4.07) (-3.39) 
gap(-1) 0.350** 0.479*** 0.302*** 0.077 0.467** 0.585*** 0.379*** 
 (2.17) (5.39) (4.43) (1.41) (2.51) (6.98) (2.98) 
srh(-1) - 0.888*** 0.457*** 0.059 0.785*** 0.769*** 0.716*** 
 - (19.7) (4.22) (0.77) (8.58) (7.45) (7.45) 
srh(-2) - - -0.157*** -0.073 - -0.0972** -0.109** 
 - - (-4.51) (-1.19) - (-2.47) (-2.29) 
constant 15.91*** -0.880 16.47** 28.4*** -4.704 -7.347 -9.384 
 (3.20) (-0.36) (2.64) (4.78) (-0.50) (-0.88) (-0.83) 
AR(1) - - - 0.49 - - - 
Obs 195 194 176 158 194 176 159 
R2 0.66 0.92 0.96 0.98 - - - 
S.E. 2.69 1.24 0.88 0.78 1.55 1.53 2.55 
AR1-prob - - - - 0.003 0.005 0.008 
AR2-prob - - - - 0.798 0.790 0.958 
J-prob - - - - 0.082* 0.148 0.065* 
J-Diff-prob - - - - 0.228 0.224 0.331 
# of Instruments - - - - 24 33 26 
of unobserved country-specic e¤ects, the coe¢cient of the lagged dependent
variable is biased heavily upward.11
Column (3) tries to deal with these unobservable country specic e¤ects
explicitly by presenting a dynamic xed e¤ects model (within estimator). All
our main variables show the correct sign and, with the exception of fem_rate,
are at least statistically signicant at a 10% level. R2 is about 0.96. Note
that we included an additional lag for the saving rate here. We did so in all
cases where this additional lag led to a noticeably improved t. The sum of
the coe¢cients of the lagged dependent variable is now about 0.3, which is
clearly far smaller than in the pooled regression variant shown in Column (2).
However, the lagged dependent variable is biased downward in this case.12 This
is due to the fact that the within estimator could be seen as a model with
transformed variables. This transformation consists in subtracting the country
means from all variables. However, the country mean of the dependent variable
is clearly correlated with the unobserved country-specic e¤ects, leading to a
negative correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the error term.
However, it can be shown that this bias vanishes with longer time series. Our
sample spanned 10 years, which is quite long for a panel, so we can hope that
this bias will not play a major role.
In Column (4), we present a further variant of the dynamic xed e¤ects
model. This time, the equation is estimated using a GLS procedure with cross
11This is because the lagged dependent variable is automatically positively correlated with
the country-specic e¤ect. This bias does not vanish, neither with more cross section units
nor with longer time series (e.g. Bond 2002).
12E.g. Bond (2002).
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section weights. The results are similar to the previous ones. Now, however,
fem_rate is also signicantly negative at a 5% level. The overall t is also better
than in variant (3), so the GLS procedure appears to increase e¢ciency.
All of the variants presented above may su¤er from an endogeneity problem
or an error in variables problem (the latter might be especially relevant to the
corruption variable). To deal with these issues, instrumental variable methods
are indicated. In the last several years, a growing body of literature has emerged
on estimation methods for dynamic panels which deal with both the endogenous
problem and the dynamic panel bias problem. Most prominent in this respect
are the contributions by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995),
Blundell and Bond (1998, 2000) and Blundell, Bond and Windmeijer (2000).13
These estimation methods, which rest on a General Methods of Moments
(GMM) approach, primarily focus on models with a large number of entities
and a comparatively small number of periods (N-asymptotic). Our data do not
have this property. We apply these methods nonetheless, but we must bear in
mind that there some problems may arise due to the big number of instruments
which these techniques typically generate.14
The main advantage of these methods is the fact that both time series and
cross section information is used, in contrast to the within estimators or rst
di¤erence estimators, which primarily rely on time series information. This is
achieved by a so-called system estimator whereby the model is estimated in
rst di¤erences and simultaneously in levels. Blundell and Bond (1998) dis-
13For a good survey, see Bond (2002).
14For a discussion of these problems, see Roodman (2007).
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cuss the necessary assumptions for this approach. The basic idea is that lagged
di¤erences in the right-hand-side variables are often uncorrelated with the unob-
served country-specic e¤ects,15 meaning that these di¤erenced variables could
be used as instruments in the level equation. This crucial assumption can be
tested using a Sargan or Hansen di¤erence test in overidentied models.
For our analysis, we used the Stata procedure xtabond2 written by David
Roodman.16 This program o¤ers a variety of possibilities and options for dealing
with the large instrument problem, so we can hope to apply these methods to
our data in a useful manner.17
Column (5) presents the result of this Blundell-Bond system estimator.
Here we assume that all right-hand variables are endogenous and are therefore
instrumented appropriately.18 In the case of the corruption index, we could
easily argue that this variable is exogenous, but there is probably an error in
variables problem involved here, so we decided to treat corr as an endogenous
variable.19
15Even if the levels of the variables are correlated with the country specic e¤ect.
16See Roodman (2006) for a detailed introduction to this program.
17 In the context of saving rates, these methods have already been applied by Loayza,
Schmidt-Hebbel and Serven (2000).
18As mentioned above, these GMM estimators usually generate a large set of (internal)
instruments. In particular, as the number of instruments is quadratic in the time dimension,
this is a problem in panels with many time periods compared to the number of entities. As
Windmeijer (2005) shows, too many instruments lead to a sort of overtting and to biased
outcomes. As a generally accepted guideline, the number of instruments should not be much
larger than the number of entities. Without any further measures to reduce the number of
instruments, the estimation procedure would generate 242 (!) instruments for equation (5),
which is undoubtedly too many. Fortunately, the program xtabond2 makes it possible to
restrict the number of lags used for the GMM-style instruments (we used two lags) and also
o¤ers the possibility of concentrating (collapsing) the information contained in the moment
restrictions. With both measures, we are able to reduce the number of instruments for equation
(5) from 242 to 24. For further details, see Roodman (2006).
19We report the results of the so-called one-step estimator. The results of the two-step
estimator hardly di¤er.
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Looking at the results, we can see that the corruption index is still highly
signicant. However, the other main variables have lost their signicance, but
prot_share and ind_share still show the expected sign. The estimated stan-
dard error, S.E., which is now higher than in the previous variants, shows the
well-known fact that instrumental variable estimators generally t the data less
well and lead to larger standard errors in the coe¢cient. Therefore, consistency
has its price. Considering the coe¢cient of the lagged saving rate, we note that
the estimated value lies between the dynamic OLS estimation of (2), which is
known to be biased upward, and the xed e¤ects estimation of (3), which is
known to be biased downward.
A basic requirement for this estimation technique (i.e. for identication) is
that the residuals in the level equation are not autocorrelated. This implies that
the residuals of the di¤erenced equation have to follow an AR(1) process (i.e.
should be near a unit root). The row AR(1) in Table 2 shows a test for an
AR(1) process. In order to yield a valid estimation, this test should reject the
null of no AR(1) process. As we can see, this is the case. On the other hand,
the residuals of the di¤erenced equation may not exhibit autocorrelation of an
order higher than one, otherwise the residuals in the level equation would not
be uncorrelated. Row AR(2) shows that this is also the case, so there seems
to be no problem in that respect.
Lastly, we used the Sargan test to investigate whether we were using valid
instruments, i.e. whether the instruments are exogenous. This is only possible
for an overidentied model, which is clearly the case here. The row J-prob
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shows the probability values of the J-statistic for an overall test.20 The row
J-Di¤-prob shows the probability values for a test of whether the instruments
used in the level equation are valid. Remember that the lagged di¤erences of
the variables must be uncorrelated with the unobserved country-specic e¤ects
in order to be valid instruments.21
The J-Di¤ statistic does not indicate an endogenous problem in the level
equation. The overall J-statistic may be somewhat better, but this could be
due to heteroscedasticity.
In Column (6), we investigate the same equation as in (5), but here we
include additional time-dummies. This procedure is often recommended as a
way to reduce heteroscedasticity. The results are very similar to the previous
case. However, prot_share is again statistically signicant, tax_wedge has the
correct sign and the overall J-statistic is now better. Therefore, the results are
somewhat better, but we are now using 33 instruments, which is already quite
a large number.
The nal equation (7) is a somewhat more usual iv-estimator. The main
variables are conventionally instrumented with lag two of the rst di¤erence
in the di¤erence equation and with lag one of the rst di¤erence in the level
equation. The lagged saving rate is instrumented as above with its GMM-
20 In Table 2 we generally present results with robust standard errors and t-values. In the
case of the Sargan test, we show the non-robust results. The reason is that the robust variant
of the Sargan test, the Hansen test, is weakened by many instruments (we have 24, and this is
a considerable number). We observed that the robust Hansen statistics were too good (nearly
one), which is a clear indication of that problem. Therefore we used the non-robust (against
heteroscedasticity) Sargan test. For details, see Roodman (2006).
21This problem does not occur in the di¤erenced equation, as the constant country-specic
e¤ects drop out due to di¤erencing.
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style instruments. The results are similar to the two previous variants. Corr
and tind_share are statically signicant, and tax_wedge and prot_share show
the expected signs; only fem_rate exhibits the wrong sign, but it is far from
signicant.
The J-statistic indicates that there might be a problem with the instru-
ments.22
Discussion of the estimation results:
The results of table 2 support our hypothesis of a positive correlation be-
tween the gross adjusted household saving rate and the degree of corruption. In
all estimated variants with the exception of (2), the variable corr showed the
expected sign and was statistically signicant at least at a 10% level. Therefore,
we believe this is a quite robust result, which conrms our simple scatter plot in
Fig. 1 with sophisticated econometrics. The estimated magnitude ranges from
0.32 to 0.94, which means that increasing the level of corruption by one point
leads to an approximate rise in the gross adjusted household saving rate of 0.5
percentage points, which is about 5% of the mean saving rates. However, this
is only the rst-round e¤ect. If we consider the dynamics through the lagged
saving rate, the long run e¤ect is even stronger, about twice as large.
Prot_share was also a variable of main interest. In every variant we tried,
prot_share showed the correct sign, and most of the time this was a statis-
tically signicant e¤ect. Only for the iv-variants (5) and (7) was this e¤ect of
minor importance. However, iv-methods very often su¤er from large standard
22But once again, estimation with additional time dummies resolved that problem.
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errors. The estimated magnitude ranges from 0.1 to 0.36, meaning that an in-
crease in prots relative to wages of one percent point leads to an increase in
the saving rate of about 0.2 percent points. As mentioned above, the long-run
e¤ect is about twice as large.
Regarding the two tax variables, tax_wedge and tind_share, our results
also indicate the expected negative e¤ect. Although these variables exhibit the
wrong sign in a few specications, only the expected sign turned out to be
statistically signicant.
According to our analysis, the e¤ect of fem_rate on household saving rates
is more questionable. Generally, this e¤ect seems to be weak. In only two cases
did we obtain a statistically signicant negative e¤ect. We got the wrong sign
in ve cases, but all were very far from any signicance. It is noticeable that
GLS methods seem to favor our hypothesis about the female employment rate.
We tried several other specications with GLS and always got the expected
signicant e¤ect. This may indicate a possible heterostatic problem. Nonethe-
less, the results regarding fem_rate are slightly unsatisfactory, especially for
the iv-methods. Therefore, we cannot draw a clear conclusion in this case.
One possible explanation for these results is that the welfare state e¤ect (via
tax_wedge) may absorb (too?) much of the inuence of the female employment
rate. Furthermore, female employment rates will be biased downwards in coun-
tries with higher shares of shadow activities. It is therefore di¢cult to measure
the marketization e¤ect in isolation.
26
-
10
0
10
20
30
0 50 100 150 200
Observations
2SE/ in sample +2SE/ out sample
depvar_ Prediction
se = .8793000000000001
Actual - Predicted
Figure 4: Actual versus predicted HSR for the FE (3)
Finally, let us visualize some of the results we have obtained so far. Fig. 4
shows actual and predicted values for the xed e¤ect estimation (Column (3)).
One might also be interested in the upward bias induced by corruption in
the mean observed household saving rates (Fig. 5). In this case, we used the
parameters from the xed e¤ects model (4). For Italy, the e¤ect is remarkable -
the true HSR would be approximately three percentage points lower.23 How-
ever, the overall message is more important: Di¤erences in aggregate household
saving rates might be considerably smaller than observed.
We also tried a number of other data sets. First, we included two additional
western OECD countries, Spain and Ireland, for which we have only a limited
23This implies a share of unobserved income in total income of approximately 21 %. How-
ever, we denitely do not intend to produce a new estimate of shadow activities.
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Figure 5: The distortive e¤ect of corruption
data range beginning with 2000 and 2002, respectively. Our results remain
practically unchanged with this extended data set.
Second, we added four Central European countries, for which the data set
is also limited in some cases. For this data set, we obtained similar results
to those presented above, but the statistical signicance was somewhat lower,
especially regarding the corruption index. We do not know the specic reason
for this di¤erence. Maybe these countries are already correcting the GDP more
generously for shadow activities, thereby reducing their reported saving rates.
However, we should note that applying GLS methods appears to mitigate this
problem. The GLS estimates for this data set were very similar to the results
reported above.
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Third, we tried a data set based on the OECD outlook data for our 20
western OECD countries. Once again, the results were practically identical to
those reported here.
5 Summary and conclusion
We have followed di¤erent traits and indications to look behind the o¢cially
published household saving rates in 24 OECD-countries. Preliminary evidence
and econometric results basically supported our suspicion that international
comparisons of household saving rates are distorted by hidden income compo-
nents - in spite of ongoing attempts to uphold the principle of exhaustiveness in
national accounting. O¢cial data seem to exaggerate cross-sectional di¤erences
in aggregate adjusted household saving rates.
While it seems somewhat presumptuous to make any precise suggestions as
to the quantitative dimension of the shadow economy, it is obvious that policy-
oriented studies relying on or requiring cross-sectional comparisons of aggregate
household saving rates are built on shaky foundations. Let us also add that
we do not believe that statistics o¢ces should simply extend the concept of
exhaustiveness by adding more and more imputed or indirectly estimated
unobservable income components. Rather, statistics authorities should publish
uncorrected and corrected data as well in order to make it clear which shadow
adjustments were implemented in various countries. This is particularly impor-
tant within the EU, were the fulllment of the Maastricht criteria on the one
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hand, and the scal redistribution on the other hand both depend on reliably
comparable GDP data.
Appendix
The sources of household saving data are the Annual National Accounts (SNA
93). From the household sectoral accounts of ANA, the following denition of the
gross household saving rate was derived: (net savings minus change of equitities in
pension funds plus consumption of xed capital)/(net disposable income plus con-
sumption of xed capital plus individual public consumption). Gross savings were
preferred because practices of calculating the consumption of xed capital might di¤er
considerably in various countries. The change of equities in pension funds was not
added to household savings, as this correction is still implemented only in some - but
not all - countries. In addition, it is subject to considerable uncertainties. Balanced
data over the period from 1995 to 2006 are available only for AUS, AUT, BEL, CHE,
CAN, DEU, DNK,FIN, FRA, GBR, ITA, JPN, KOR, NLD, NOR, PRT, SWE and
USA, but not for IRL, ESP, CZE, HUN, POL and SVK.
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